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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN INVESTIGATIVE GRAND
JURY PROCEEDINGS: WASHINGTON CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORY ACT OF
1971-R.C.W. §§ 10.27.120-.140 (1971).
The right of a grand jury witness to the presence and limited assist-
ance of counsel while testifying before an investigative grand jury was
established in Washington by the Criminal Investigatory Act of 1971.1
The Act provides that a witness may be accompanied and advised by
counsel until immunity is granted. 2 After a grant of immunity, counsel
is excluded from the proceedings but may be consulted outside the
grand jury room. 3
The purpose of the statute is to protect the rights of the witness who
is testifying before a grand jury. A grand jury witness is confronted
with the jury's extraordinary investigative powers4 which are un-
checked by normal procedural safeguards; 5 his only protection is the
privilege against self-incrimination. 6 Without counsel in this setting,
I. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.27.120-.140 (1971). WASH. REV. CODE § 10.28.075
(1967) allowed witness' counsel to be present during grand jury proceedings, but in
no way delineated or limited the scope of the attorney's function during the proceedings.
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.27.120 (1971) provides:
Any individual called to testify before a grand jury or special inquiry judge,
whether as a witness or principal, if not represented by an attorney appearing with
the witness before the grand jury or special inquiry judge, must be told of his privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Such an individual has a right to representation by
an attorney to advise him as to his rights, obligations and duties before the grand
jury or special inquiry judge, and must be informed of this right. The attorney may
be present during all proceedings attended by his client unless immunity has been
granted pursuant to section 13 of this 1971 act. After immunity has been granted,
such an individual may leave the grand jury room to confer with his attorney.
3. Id.
4. The grand jury can typically subpoena a witness, compel testimony through a
grant of immunity and enforce compliance with orders to testify through the use of the
contempt power. In addition, grand jury proceedings are secret and ex parte. See notes
22, 23, 26, 48 and 49, and accompanying text, infra.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 897 (1955) where the court observed:
Such a body [the grand jury] is not charged with the duty of deciding innocence or
guilt and, for this reason, its proceedings have never been conducted with assiduous
regard for the preservation of procedural safeguards which normally attends the
ultimate trial of the issues. Thus, in such proceedings, there is no right to counsel,
no right of confrontation, no right to cross-examine or to introduce evidence in
rebuttal.
See text accompanying notes 40-42, infra.
6. In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), the Court held that persons
appearing before a grand jury are entitled to the privilege against self-incrimination.
The scope of the privilege is summarized in Note, Compulsory Immunity Legislation:
Tile 11 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 1971 U. ILL. L. F. 91, 93.
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the witness' rights, and particularly his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, 7 can easily be abused.
The Criminal Investigatory Act's provision for counsel appears jus-
tified when one considers the witness' delicate position and recent ex-
tensions of the right to counsel at other stages of the criminal process.
8
Washington's statute, however, is a significant departure from grand
jury protections provided in other jurisdictions because it provides for
the presence of counsel as a matter of right.9 This note examines the
policy basis for Washington's statute and the effect this additional
protection for the witness may have on the investigative efficiency of
the grand jury.
I. THE TRADITIONAL GRAND JURY AND THE
EXCLUSION OF COUNSEL
Challenges to grand jury indictments on the ground that a witness
or the accused was denied the presence and assistance of counsel have
7. The balance between the requirement for information and policy against
self-incrimination generally weighs in favor of the privilege. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436. 460 (1966) states the policy behind the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination which is essentially to force "the government seeking to punish an
individual [to] produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors
rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth."
8. Recent decisions indicate that extension of the right of counsel to a witness ap-
pearing before an investigative grand jury might be required under the fifth, sixth, and
fourteenth amendments. See Coleman v. Alabama. 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (right to counsel
at preliminary hearing): Mempa v. Rhay. 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to counsel at
probation revocation hearing): Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (right to
counsel at a lineup); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to counsel during
custodial interrogation); and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to
counsel on appeal). Several articles have advocated this extension of counsel to the
grand jury witness as a matter of constitutional right. See Steele. Right to Counsel at the
Grand Jury Stage of Criminal Proceedings, 36 Mo. L. REV. 193 (197 1) [hereinafter
cited as Steele]: Neshbesher, Right of Counsel Before a Grand Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189
(1966); Comment, The Rights of a Witnes., Before a Grand Jury, 1967 DUKE L.J. 97
(1967).
9. Courts in all jurisdictions have been reluctant to extend to a grand jury witness
the right of the presence and assistance of counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Levinson,
405 F.2d 971, 980 (6th Cir. 1968); Commonwealth v. McCloskey. 443 Pa. 117. 277 A.
2d 764 (1971). But see Sheridan v. Garrison. 273 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. La. 1967). rev'd1
on other grounds, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969).
Grand jury statutes also generally exclude counsel. See, e.g., FED. R. CR151. P. 6(d):
CAI. P1 NA1 CODE § 939 (West 1970); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 190.25(3) (McKinney
1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §209 (Supp. 1971). Bit see MICH. STAT. ANN.
§28.959(5) (Supp. 1971) (giving a witness the right to counsel after immunity is




generally been dismissed as inconsistent with historical concepts of the
grand jury.'0 The tendency has been to treat the grand jury as sacro-
sanct because of its long history and constitutional prerogatives. 1 It is
therefore necessary to briefly examine the history of the grand jury to
determine why witness' counsel has never been provided for in grand
jury proceedings.
The grand jury has been a basic element of the Anglo-American
criminal process since 116612 and theoretically served as the citizens'
voice in the enforcement .of criminal laws. 13 The grand jury, con-
sisting of from 12 to 23 freeholders selected from within the jurisdic-
tion of the summoning court, performed two separate functions, one
protective and the other investigative. 14 As protector, the grand jury
10. Steele, supra note 8, at 207. See also People v. lanniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235
N.E.2d 439 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827 (1968); People v. Robinson, 66 Misc. 2d
639, 323 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1971); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 277 A.2d
764 (1971); United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Kane, 243 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
11. Reliance on traditional concepts of the grand jury is facilitated by a marked
lack of information about the institution. Though the grand jury has existed since 1166,
its procedures and powers have never been comprehensively defined. This is largely due
to the grand jury's origin in common law, a development influenced by extra-legal fac-
tors, and a lack of statutory clarification. Note, The Grand Jury--Its Investigatory
Powers and Limitations, 37 MINN. L. REV. 586, 587 (1953).
Perhaps the most pervasive factor in keeping witness' counsel out of grand jury pro-
ceedings has been the Supreme Court's frequent analogies to the traditional lack of
counsel in grand jury proceedings while deciding cases concerning the right to counsel
in administrative and other non-judicial hearings. In Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S.
411, 430 (1969) (concerning a witness' right to counsel in a state administrative investi-
gation), the Court stated in dictimn:
We do not mean to say that the same analysis applies to every body which has an
accusatory function. The grand jury, for example, need not provide all the proce-
dural guarantees [the right to counsel] alleged by appellant to be applicable to the
Commission. As this Court noted in Hannah, "The grand jury merely investigates
and reports. It does not try." Moreover, "[t] he functions of that institution and its
constitutional prerogatives are rooted in long centuries of Anglo-American his-
tory."
See also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287
(1959); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
To date, the Supreme Court has not examined the issue of witness' right to counsel in
the context of the modern investigative grand jury.
12. R. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLES PANEL 1 (1963) describes in detail the history of
the grand jury from its origin in England at the Assize of Claredon in 1166. For an
abbreviated general treatment of the history of the grand jury see L. ORFIELD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST To APPEAL, 137-46 (1947); Spain, The Grand
Jury, Past and Present: A Survey, 2 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 119 (1964).
13. R. YOUNGER, supra note 12, at 245-46.
14. Though the objectives of the two basic functions of the grand jury are totally
inconsistent with each other, neither courts nor statutes have differentiated in the
treatment of the two functions. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6, which governs the
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was supposed to stand between the accused and the accuser.' 5 If the
evidence presented was insufficient to establish probable cause, the
grand jurors no-billed the accused, thus preventing hasty or malicious
prosecution.1 6 This protective function of the grand jury was incorpo-
rated by the fifth amendment which guarantees criminal defendants in
federal court the right to an indictment for all serious crimes.1 7 As in-
vestigator, the grand jury inquired independently into crimes com-
mitted in its jurisdiction18 and issued indictments on the finding of
probable cause.' 9
Although the grand jury has performed these two different and in-
consistent functions, the justifications given by courts for excluding
counsel have been identical for both protective and investigative
grand juries. The first justification has been that the grand jury has
always been considered the protector of the accused. A witness' or an
accused's rights were presumed to be adequately protected by the pres-
ence of an independent group of citizens who were charged with pro-
Special (investigative) Grand Jury proceedings instituted under the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-34 (1970). as well as traditional protective
grand juries under FED. R. CRIM. P. 7.
15. The scope of this note does not include an examination of the protective
grand jury and the issue of right to counsel in that context. References to the pro-
tective grand jury will merely summarize arguments made in their behalf. and are
not meant to imply that a witness is adequately protected in Such proceedings.
16. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375. 395 (1962).
17. U.S. CONS. amend. V provides that "no person shall be held to answer for a
capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand
jury." Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) upheld California's shift from indict-
ment to information by reasoning that a flexible interpretation of due process in the
fourteenth amendment did not require prosecution by indictment. Though Hurtado has
been subsequently upheld (e.g., Gaines v. Washington. 277 U.S. 81 (1928)). the founda-
tion of the decision was seriously weakened by recent decisions. See, e.g., Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding the fourteenth amendment guarantees the sixth
amendment right of trial by jury to a state defendant charged with a serious crime).
Today 24 states require that prosecutions for all or most felonies be initiated by in-
dictment- in 26 states non-capital cases may be prosecuted by either information or in-
dictment at the option of the prosecutor. Most of these states use the information, which
is generally a written accusation made by a public prosecutor without the intervention
of a grand jury, as the principal means of initiating prosecutions. For a summary of the
pertinent statutory provisions see Steele, supra note 8, at 193, 194.
18. Hale v. Henkel. 201 U.S. 43 (1906) is the classic case expounding the investiga-
tive function of the grand jury. See also Blakely, Aspects of the Evidence Gathering
Process in Organized Crime Cases: A Prelimninar' Analysis, reprinted in THE
PRESIDENT's COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. TASK
FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 80 (1967).
19. The investigative function of the grand jury has remained as an important as-
pect of the investigation of organized crime. See, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-34 (1970): WASH. REV. CODE §§10.27.120-.140 (1971).
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tecting him. 20 Second, the function of the grand jury was merely to
determine whether a trial was necessary. 21 If a witness' rights were
abused, the witness could be exonerated at a later trial. Finally, courts
feared that the presence of counsel would interfere with grand jury
secrecy,22 disrupt the ex parte nature of grand jury proceedings23 and
thus seriously impair the investigative efficiency of the grand jury.
Although the exclusion of counsel may have been justified in the
context of the historical or theoretical grand jury, the contemporary
grand jury investigation raises a number of new questions.
II. THE MODERN INVESTIGATIVE GRAND JURY
The modern investigative grand jury typically functions as the in-
vestigative arm of the prosecutor:24 the prosecutor usually decides
20. See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 430 (1969); United States v. Lev-
inson, 405 F.2d 971, 980 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459,
460-461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 (1959); United States v. Kane, 243 F.
Supp. 746, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
21. See, e.g., Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 430 (1969); Hannah v. Larche,
363 U.S. 420, 449 (1960); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957); United States v. Lev-
inson, 405 F.2d 971, 980 (6th Cir. 1968).
22. United States v. Procter and Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (speaks of
the "indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceeding"); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399-400 (1959). United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617,
628-629 (3d Cir. 1954) summarized the purposes of grand jury secrecy as follows:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to
insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent per-
sons subject to indictment or theirfriends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to
prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify
before [the] grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have
information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect [an]
innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been
under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there is no
probability of guilt.
23. Only evidence for the prosecution is heard; an accused has no right to appear,
nor to present evidence or witnesses. In re Black, 47 F.2d 542, 544 (2d Cir. 1931);
United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1968). If witness' counsel were per-
mitted to play an active role in the proceedings, the grand jury stage could turn into a
"mini-trial."
24. See generally Steele, supra note 8, at 200; Blakely, supra note 18, at 80, 84
(1967).
Dession, From Indictment to Information, Implications of the Shift, 42 YALE LJ. 163,
189 (1932) comments on the value of the grand jury to the prosecutor as follows:
To the prosecution ... a grand jury affords an early, secret, and ex parte hearing,
where unwilling or timid witnesses may be subpoenaed and questioned before or
after the lodging of a specific charge against anyone, and under the circumstances
most favorable to disclosure. Barring an occasional "leak," no premature disclo-
sure of the state's case is entailed. Persons called before such a body have the vul-
nerable status of mere witnesses. They are unattended by counsel. The value of
such a "deposition mill" is constantly attested by federal prosecutors....
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which cases will be investigated; 25 he subpoenas witnesses in the name
of the grand jury; 26 he organizes the daily work of the grand jury and
presents and questions witnesses before the grand jurors;27 and he
acts as the grand jury's primary legal advisor.2 8 With this much influ-
ence, a prosecutor is usually able to get the grand jury to adopt any
position with respect to a proceeding. 29 It is therefore difficult for one
to picture the grand jury as the "independent protector" of the witness
or the accused.30
Another feature of the modern investigative grand jury is the in-
quisitorial focus of the jurors.3 1 The investigative grand jury is con-
vened to investigate and to indict; the protective function is secondary
and probably operates only to prevent blatant abuse of the grand jury
25. United States v. Steel, 238 F.Supp. 580. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). As a practical
matter, the prosecutor will have determined beforehand what cases the grand jury will
investigate, but typically the grand jurors are empowered to also inquire into any of-
fense of which they have knowledge. See, e.g., WASH. REV CODE § 10.27.100 (1971):
The grand jurors shall inquire into.., all ... indictable offenses within the county
which are presented to them by a public attorney or otherwise come to their knowl-
edge.
26. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.27.140 (1971)- CAL, PENAL CODE § 939.2 (West
1970); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 190.50(2) (McKinney 1971).
27. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.27.070 (1971); CAL. PENAL CODE § 935 (West
1970); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-4(a) (Smith-Hurd 1970); MICH. STAT. ANN. §
628.63 (1947): N.Y. CODE CR15N. PROC. § 190.55 (McKinney 1971).
28. The grand jurors can also go to the court for advice. In addition, many jurisdic-
tions allow the state attorney general to participate in lieu of the prosecutor upon the
request of the grand jury. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.20.070 (1970); C%L. PENAL
CODE §§ 935. 936 (West 1970). Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 926, 936 (West 1970)
and NEV. REV. S-lAT. § 172.205 (1967) which both provide for the hiring of experts.
investigators, and special counsel upon the request of the grand jury.
29. Ploscowe and Spiero, The Prosecuting Attorney's Office and the Control of Or-
ganized Crime, in II MANUAL FOR PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS 315 (Ploscowe ed. 1956).
The authors assert: "It is a very poor prosecutor who cannot bring a grand jury to adopt
any position with respect to the proceeding that he wishes to take." Id. at 318. This. of
course, is a generalization which depends on the individuals making up a grand jury. A
grand jury can still exercise a certain degree of independence, but the ability to exercise
this independence is minimized by the control of and the dependence on the prosecuting
attorney.
30. Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Sitpergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153.
154(1965).
31. Id. at 154-155. The author is especially cynical of the grand juror's fairminded-
ness as either protector or investigator. He observes:
Realistically, the most demanding task faced by the conscientious prosecutor in a
grand jury room is that of making a defendant's rights understandable to a grand
jury bent on indicting without sufficient evidence but upon great provocation.
On the grand juror's fervor to indict even without evidence of criminal activity:
The insistence is upon action, on getting things done. If a man has behaved badly he
should be punished-not just for violating the law, but for nisbehaving. Personal
standards of conduct supplant those established by the legislature and each grand




system by the prosecutor. Even if the grand jurors wanted to assert
their independence, they must normally rely on the advice of the pros-
ecutor, who is the very person the grand jurors are charged to re-
strain. 32
The witness is in an exceedingly delicate position when testifying
before an investigative grand jury.3 3 Confrontation with the prose-
cutor places the lay witness not represented by counsel at a distinct
disadvantage. The prosecutor can ask leading and manipulative ques-
tions which will place the witness and potential defendant in the
poorest possible light.34 The witness' only protection is his privilege
against self-incrimination, yet warnings concerning this basic right
have not been required.35 The witness must determine for himself the
incriminating nature of questions and answers36 and he must avoid
waiving his privilege against self-incrimination. 37 It is generally recog-
nized that these are not easy decisions for even the most sophisticated
attorney.38
The lack of procedural safeguards in grand jury proceedings fur-
ther exacerbates the witness' dilemma. 39 In addition to the absence of
32. See Antell, supra note 30, at 154.
33. See Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964); People v. lanniello, 21
N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d 439, 443, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827 (1968); Commonwealth v.
McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 277 A.2d 764,777 (1971).
34. Y. KAMISAR, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME-EQUAL JUSTICE IN THE GATE-
HOUSES AND MANSIONS OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 13 (1965). The author dis-
tinguishes between the right to tell one's story in his own way and one's ability to deal
with a trained adversary who asks questions. He emphasizes that it is difficult for the
witness to deal adequately with leading questions.
35. Even though a witness may be indicted on his own testimony, several courts
have ruled that the grand jury witness is not entitled to be informed of his privilege
against self-incrimination. United States v. Luxemberg, 374 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 (1959);
United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955);
People v. Robinson, 66 Misc. 2d 639, 323 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1971). But see United States v.
Leighton, 265 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (warning of possible self-incrimination plus
consultation with attorney outside grand jury room is all the protection constitu-
tionally necessary).
36. In Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (195 1), the Court explained the
privilege against self-incrimination. Not only is the witness privileged not to answer
questions which directly incriminate him, he also is privileged not to answer questions
which would "furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute."
37. The Supreme Court has posited:
Thus, if the witness himself elects to waive his privilege... and discloses his crim-
inal connections, he is not permitted to stop, but must go on and make full disclo-
sure.
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951). See also C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF
EVIDENCE 273 (1954).
38. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
39. See note 5, supra.
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counsel, the scope of the grand jury's inquiry is generally not limited
as it would be at trial;40 there is frequently no requirement that an
indictment be based on evidence which would be admissable at trial;41
and because of the ex parte proceedings, the witness has neither the
right to confront those who might implicate him, nor the right to tes-
tify in his own behalf.42
Even though the witness is not protected by normal procedural
safeguards, he is forced to make decisions when testifying before the
grand jury which will be legally binding on him. 43 If he answers in-
criminating questions, he will certainly be indicted and his incrimi-
nating testimony can be used to impeach his later testimony at trial. 44
By answering incriminating questions, the witness may be deemed to
have waived his privilege against self-incrimination. 45 If he refuses to
testify, or invokes his privilege against self-incrimination, the grand
jury is free to draw conclusions. 46 If the witness does not testify truth-
fully, he can be prosecuted for perjury.47 If he refuses to testify after a
grant of immunity, he is subject to punishment for civil contempt 48 or
indictment for criminal contempt. 49
40. See, e.g., Blair v. United States. 250 U.S. 273,283 (1919). But see People v. lan-
niello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d 439. 443, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 827 (1968) where
the court referred to a witness' "right to refuse to answer questions having no bearing on
the subject of the investigation."
A grand jury subpoena duces tecun is subject to attack where the requirements are
unreasonably broad. See People v. Allen, 410 III. 508, 103 N.E.2d 92, 94 (1952).
41. See, e.g., Costello v. United States. 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956) (upholding an
indictment based solely on hearsay evidence). See also Laughlin v. United States. 385
F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968); People v. Myers. 46 III.
2d 270, 263 N.E.2d 113 (1970); State v. Ferrante, Ill N.J. Super. 299, 268 A.2d 301
(1970); State v. Parks, 437 P.2d 642 (Alaska 1968). But see United States v. Tane. 329
F.2d 848, 853 (2d Cir. 1964); CAL. PENAL CODE 939.6(b) (West 1970) which provides
that an indictment must be based on admissible evidence, but is not void because inad-
missible evidence was received by the grand jury.
42. See note 23, supra.
43. See People v. lanniello. 21 N.Y.2d 418. 235 N.E.2d 439, 445, cert. denied, 393
U.S. 827 (1968).
44. Jones v. United States. 342 F.2d 863. 868 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See also Harris v.
New York. 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding prior inconsistent statements made to the po-
lice without Miranda warnings were admissible in evidence for the purpose of im-
peaching the defendant's credibility).
45. See note 37. supra.
46. See note 44 and accompanying text, supra.
47. See WASH. REV. CODE §10.27.130(1971).
48. Id. See also Shillitani v. United States. 384 U.S. 364 (1966) (courts have power
to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt).
The threat of civil contempt is not so great in jurisdictions such as Washington where
grand jury terms seldom extend beyond six months. However, the terms of federal
grand juries under the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 can extend over a period
of years.
49. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
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The prosecutor's control of grand jury proceedings, the lack of pro-
cedural safeguards for the witness, plus the legally binding nature of a
witness' testimony have eroded prior justifications for the exclusion of
counsel. These same factors prompted the inclusion of counsel in
grand jury proceedings by the Washington legislature.50
III. WASHINGTON'S PROVISION FOR WITNESS' COUNSEL
AND ITS ANTICIPATED IMPACT ON GRAND JURY
INVESTIGATIONS
The Criminal Investigatory Act eases the dilemma of the investiga-
tive grand jury witness by providing for the presence and assistance of
counsel. 51 The Act states that a witness called before an investigative
grand jury has a right to representation by an attorney and that the
witness must be informed of that right.52 Counsel is allowed to be pre-
sent during all proceedings attended by his client until immunity is
granted by the supervising court.53 After a grant of immunity, the at-
torney is excluded from the grand jury room. 54 The attorney's role in
the grand jury proceedings is strictly limited to advising his client con-
50. The inclusion of this provision for counsel in the Criminal Investigatory Act
was facilitated by the narrow focus of the Act. No consideration was required for the
traditional protective function of the grand jury. Rather, the legislature sought only to
provide the mechanism of the grand jury to assist in the investigation of organized crime
and municipal corruption. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.27.010 (1971).
Two alternative provisions for witness' counsel were considered by the Washington
legislature. The first provision, similar to WASH. REV. CODE § 10.28.075 (1967),
would have allowed counsel not only to be present and to advise the witness, but also to
question his client concerning testimony elicited before the grand jury. The second alter-
native would have excluded counsel from all proceedings, but would have allowed con-
sultation with an attorney outside the grand jury room. Wash. Senate Judiciary Comm.,
Suggested Changes to H.B. 175 (on file with the Washington Judicial Council, Univer-
sity of Washington School of Law, Seattle, Wash.).
51. Cf. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 190.40 (McKinney 1971) under which the
witness receives immunity unless he expressly waives it in writing or unless he gives
evidence not responsive to any inquiry with the knowledge that it is not responsive.
New York repealed the provision in 1953 but re-enacted it in 1971.
New York and most federal jurisdictions allow the witness to consult with his
attorney outside the grand jury room. People v. lanniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d
439 (1968), recognizes explicitly the right of a grand jury witness to consult with his
attorney outside the grand jury room concerning the witness' legal rights. At the
federal level, though FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 does not provide for witness' consultation
with counsel, the practice has been informally recognized in some federal jurisdictions.
See, e.g., United States v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v.
Leighton, 265 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).





cerning his right to answer or not to answer questions and the form of
the answer.55
These provisions give substance to the witness' privilege against
self-incrimination. By being present during questioning, counsel will
hear the exact questions posed in a particular context and will be
better able to protect and advise his client.56 The advice of counsel
will enable the grand jury witness to make informed decisions con-
cerning his testimony.
The impact of the Act on the ex parte nature of the proceedings
will be minimized by the fact that the attorney's participation in the
proceeding is strictly limited to advising his client.57 This precludes
the possibility of a "mini-trial" and will not impair expeditious investi-
gation.
The secrecy of the grand jury proceeding could be compromised by
a single attorney who represents all the participants in an organized
crime.58 The attorney might hear all of the testimony, see the direc-
tion of the investigation and advise his clients accordingly, thereby
avoiding incrimination of the group. 59 A related problem arises when
the attorney who represents a group of conspirators is hired and con-
trolled by the head of the conspiracy. An unscrupulous attorney in this
position could potentially control the testimony of participants in the
conspiracy to serve the interests of his employer. This practice would
be especially damaging to an investigation where a member of the
conspiracy was willing to testify and would have testified but for the
presence of the attorney.
Similar breaches of secrecy and control and subornation of wit-
nesses have always been present in grand jury investigations. Wit-
nesses will normally relate the substance of the questions and their tes-
55. Id. § 10.27.080 (1971) provides in part:
The attorney advising the witness shall only advise such witness concerning his
right to answer or not answer any questions and the form of his answer and shall
not otherwise engage in the proceedings.
56. But cf. United States v. Leighton, 265 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1967): People v.
lanniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 235 N.E.2d 439 (1968). which held that a witness' rights
were adequately protected where the witness was allowed to consult with his attorney
outside the grand jury room.
57. WAsH. REv. (ODE § 10.27.080 (1971).
58. See note 23, su pra, for the reasons for grand jury secrecy.
59. Enker and Elsen, Counsel fr the Suspect: Messiah v. United States and Esco-
bedo v. Illinois, 49 MI N. L. REV. 47. 74 n.84 (1964) allude to this potential ad-
verse effect of the presence of witness' counsel.
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timony to their attorneys, 60 and leaders of conspiracies have surely
exerted much control over their co-conspirators in the past.6'
However, with counsel present, the potential for abuse in these two
areas is significantly increased. 62
Three possible remedies or deterrents exist to mitigate the loss of
the investigative efficiency of the grand jury. First, when the witness
refuses to testify on the grounds of self-incrimination and is granted
immunity by the court, counsel is excluded from the grand jury pro-
ceedings.6 3 This will eliminate any immediate control the attorney
may have been exercising over the witness, and will allow the witness
to testify freely within the secret proceedings. Second, if the witness
refuses to testify after a grant of immunity or when he cannot claim
his privilege against self-incrimination, the investigation can continue
after imposition of the contempt power, either civil or criminal. Civil
contempt gives the court the power summarily to enforce compliance
with its order to testify by having the witness imprisoned. 64 The im-
prisonment continues until the witness testifies as ordered, but in no
case can the imprisonment extend beyond the term of the grand jury.65
Criminal contempt is similarly utilized where the witness fails to
conform with the order of the court, but the witness can be impris-
oned for a definite period exceeding the term of the grand jury if he is
later found guilty of the charge of contempt at trial.66 Finally, the
60. Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before a Grand Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189, 206-07
(1966) questions how much secrecy is preserved by excluding witness' counsel.
61. See, e.g., Blakely, supra note 18, at 83, quoting the testimony of former At-
torney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach who had stated that numerous prosecutions
had been abandoned because key witnesses had refused to testify for fear of being mur-
dered. '
62. But see Preliminary Report submitted by the 1971 King County Grand Jury (on
file at the Office of the King County Prosecutor, Seattle, Wash.) which demonstrates
that an investigation conducted under the Criminal Investigatory Act can be
both productive and expeditious. A total of 34 indictments involving 54 individuals
were presented by the grand jury. One indictment involved an alleged organized crime
of 19 past and present public officials and law enforcement officers.
63. WASH. REV. CODE §10.27.120 (1971).
64. See Hilts, The Increasing Use of the Power of Contempt, 32 MONT. L. REV.
183, 186 (197 1) where the author comments:
It is commonly felt that a court must be able to coerce enforcement of its decrees
and orders to further the administration of justice. The usual justification for the
use of summary punishment is that the contemnor ".... holds the keys to his
freedom in his willingness to comply with the court's directive."
65. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966) (holding sentence for civil con-
tempt was improper where it extended beyond the end of the grand jury's term).
66. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
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possibility of a perjury prosecution should help ensure that testimony
will be truthful."37 Today, however, the possibility of perjury prosecu-
tion is unlikely, and if prosecution materializes the likelihood of con-
viction is not high." 8 When witness' counsel is present and does suborn
the witness, the chances for successful perjury prosecution become
even less.
The Act does give adequate protection to the grand jury witness,
but this protection is achieved at the cost of potential adverse effects
in the investigation of organized crime. Existing remedies and deter-
rents will only serve to minimize this impairment of investigative
efficiency."":1
CONCLUSION
Proper evaluation of the right to counsel in investigative grand jury
proceedings can only be made when the grand jury is examined in its
modern context. Control by the prosecutor and the inquisitorial focus
of the grand jurors have eliminated the protections once afforded a
witness in a hearing by a group of citizens independently determining
probable cause. In this modern context, Washington's provision for
witness' counsel is sound.
The fact that the grand jury proceedings are not technically deter-
minative of guilt or innocence is of little consolation to the witness
whose grand jury testimony is legally binding upon him. The witness
can potentially incriminate himself, waive his privilege against
self-incrimination, commit perjury or be charged with civil or criminal
contempt. Additional costs of a grand jury indictment to an individual
must also be recognized. Arrest, loss of job, and humiliation are sig-
nificant disabilities which the individual incurs before he is proven
67. Blakely, supra note 18, at 88.
68. 1956-65 Aiy. GEN. ANN. REP. 288, reports that during the ten year period
from 1956 through 1965, 227 defendants were charged with perjury. Of those
charged with perjury, only 52.7 percent were found guilty as compared to 78.7 percent
of the defendants in all other criminal cases.
The court in State v. Wallis, 50 Wn.2d 350, 311 P.2d 659, 660 (1957) observed that
" p]elijury requires a higher measure of proof than any other crime known to the
law, treason alone, excepted."
69. One way to strengthen the investigative efficiency of the grand jury would be to
facilitate perjury prosecution. See Blakely, supra note 18, at 88.
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guilty. The stigma of a grand jury indictment will accompany an indi-
vidual even though he is later exonerated at trial.70
The compromise adopted by some jurisdictions which allow the
witness to consult his attorney while testifying outside the grand jury
room does not adequately or fairly protect the witness. 71 The grand
jury secrecy that is saved by this procedure is insignificant and is more
than offset by the danger to the witness of a mistake in judgment or
of a breakdown in communications between the witness and the attorney.
With the inclusion of counsel in Washington grand jury proceed-
ings, there will undoubtedly be some impairment of efficiency in the
investigation of organized crime through breaches of secrecy and the
stifling of testimony or the subornation of witnesses. These impair-
ments will be minimized by excluding counsel after a grant of im-
munity. Also, the threat of the contempt power will encourage reluc-
tant witnesses to testify.
The preservation of the investigative efficiency which could poten-
tially be lost by the inclusion of counsel should not be achieved by
sacrificing the rights of the grand jury witness.72 As a matter of
fairness, if not constitutional right, the witness should be provided with
the right to representation by counsel in investigative grand jury pro-
ceedings.
70. The problem presented in this basic proposition was recognized in State v.
Parks, 437 P.2d 642, 646 (Alaska 1968) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring) (upholding indict-
ment based solely on hearsay).
71. See note 51, supra.
72. An alternative approach to protecting the rights of the grand jury witness is to
confer automatic immunity. See note 5 1, supra.
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